——缅甸政局观察

作者.福果

缅甸“21世纪彬龙会议”最鲜明的政治目的是实现民族和解与国家和平。从前三次会议召开的情况来看，总的说来都不成功，也没有一次取得预期的效果，因而举世期盼的缅甸国家和平依然十分遥远。不过“会议”似乎也形成了一个最大的共识，那就是需要各方切实建立政治互信。既然是互信，那就某一方向对方证明自己诚信。互信不是一个口号，更不是虚假的扯出一个幌子。如果说的是一套，做得又是一套，那么建立互信根本就是骗人的鬼话。常言说“听其言，观其行”，而最重要的还是观其行。

“建立政治互信”说的最多的是缅甸军方，提得最响亮的也是缅甸军方，而且缅军一直拿NCA协议说事，NCA协议的性质和内容加在一起就等于一个政治圈套姑且不论，缅军方动辄指责尚未签署NCA协议的民族革命组织，硬是把是否签署NCA协议作为参加“彬龙会议”的前提条件。那么，问题在于是不是全部签署NCA协议缅甸的内战就真的停息了呢？联邦政治谈判协商委员会（FPNCC）七家组织成员至今没有一家愿意签署，其根本原因就在于，签署不签署NCA协议，一样会遭到缅军的军事进攻。

据缅甸在线9月9日报道，南掸邦军（RCSS）从签署NCA协议至今三年时间里，缅军向南掸邦军（RCSS）共发动了80次战争。

缅甸“21世纪彬龙会议第三次会议”于2018年7月16日结束至今，短短的54天时间，缅甸军方就向同盟军发动了大小10多次军事进攻。初步统计如下：

1、7月19日5时，缅军向同盟军211旅7营和8营某阵地发动进攻，战斗持续近3个小时；

2、7月21日8时，缅军向同盟军211旅3营驻防贵概县以北的青木水阵地发起进攻，战斗持续2个小时；

3、8月13日15时10分至24时，缅军11师210营和219营对同盟军511旅贵概县以北、南帕嘎以东的丁果山驻防阵地发动5此进攻；

4、8月14日7时，缅军11师一部又一次向同盟军511旅贵概县以北、南帕嘎以东的丁果山驻防阵地发动进攻；

5、8月17日9时，缅军99师一部向同盟军211旅7营阵地发动进攻，战斗持续近3个小时；

6、8月21日9时，缅军99师一部向同盟军211旅8营某阵地发动进攻；

7、8月29日13时，缅军99师一部向同盟军211旅8营在次发起进攻；

8、8月30日12时，缅军99师一部向同盟军211旅8营又一次发动进攻；

9、8月30日慕泰缅军向同盟军17营红岩解放区南端防线炮击5发进行挑衅；

10、8月31日5时50分，缅军又一次向同盟军511旅武工队发动进攻，战斗持续至10时30分；

11、8月31日19时，缅军腊戍军区炮兵炮击同盟军211旅8营在帕盆北侧的莱沃山阵地；

12、9月2日9时46分，缅军99师一部向同盟军萨尔温江侧面后山阵地发动进攻；战斗持续约40分钟，我军主动撤出；

另外，缅军还向同盟军发起数次军事挑衅。由于同盟军主动撤离，没有发生交火。

在此期间，缅军还向克钦独立军、德昂民族解放军、若开等多家民族革命武装发动战争。这就是缅甸军所谓的“政治互信”？

缅甸军方言行不一，行为诡异，固然有其深刻的政治背景，但无论如何也无法掩盖其鲜明的政治目的。

先说政治背景

1、1962年耐温发动军人政变，缅军便占据缅甸的政治舞台，半个多世纪以来，缅甸联邦政府一直被“军人集团”所取代。

2、缅甸军人政府一手炮制了“08宪法”，而“08宪法”实质上是一部“军人宪法”，其中有几条关键内容，摘录如下：第六条第六款：“始终坚持军队能参与和担负对国家政治生活的领导”；第二十条第二款：“缅甸国防军享有独立处理所有军队有关事务的权利”；第三款：“国防军总司令是国家一切武装力量的统帅”；第六款：“军队的主要职责是捍卫宪法。在《08宪法》的细则中，还规定了两条最核心的内容，锁死了缅军方至高无上的特权。一是军队在议员中的席位占总数的25%；二是缅甸联邦国家的立法、司法和行政权力的决议，必须由高于75%的议席同意才能生效。抛开其它的特权不论，仅从以上这些条款中，勿须作任何详细分析，也能得出一个最明显的判定：“08宪法”赋予了缅甸国防军凌驾于缅甸联邦政府之上的至高无上的特权。

3、缅甸国防军长期发动内战的经济支撑有四个主要方面。其一，国家“正常的军费预算”；其二，军产（涵盖军工、商品生产，国内国际贸易，缅甸翡翠、玉石、天然气、水利等主要资源的开采利用；）；其三，军队制控的外币结算收益；其四，国际经费来源中很大比例部分用作军费。美国《外交政策》曾撰文称，缅甸军政府在“走向终结”前孤注一掷培植的利益集团已成为这个国家经济改革的障碍，这些“利益集团”被缅甸国人成为军队的“密友”，实质上仍然由军方“直接掌控”，只不过是军产换了一件掩人耳目的单薄外衣，大缅甸集团（Max Myanmar Group）便是一个最好的例证。

4、大缅族主义土壤。大家知道，缅甸联邦人口约5200万，由135个民族组成，其中缅族约3500万，占全国人口总数的68%。缅族为主体民族。英国殖民印缅时期，印度总督大贺胥在深入了解并研究缅族人以后，曾经得出这样的结论:在东方众多的民族之中，我从未见过一个民族象缅族人这样狂妄自大。一语中的，这句话道出了缅族人的民族秉性。有人曾做过类似的调查，缅甸从1947年独立以来，绝大多数缅族人存在这样一个非常荒谬的理念，缅甸联邦是缅族人的联邦而非135个民族的联邦，缅甸是缅族人的天下而非135个民族共同的家园。可以说缅族人的心里笼罩着非常偏激的大缅主义情绪。基于此，缅甸国防军“理所当然”推波助澜加以利用，一方面不断使用军事力量侵害其它少数民族合法权益，另一方面成为了维护缅族人利益的“英雄”。于是，拥有至高无上特权的“缅甸国防军”深深扎根于“大缅族主义”的“肥沃土壤”，不仅显得“根深叶茂”，而且似乎“更加郁郁葱葱”。

    仅从以上四点不难看出，缅甸国防军是一支拥有至高无上特权、凌驾于联邦政府之上、几乎完全占有整个国家资源、拥有占据绝对优势的主体民族和大缅族主义土壤、已经营了长达半个多世纪的军队。有这样一支远胜于任何一家民族革命武装十倍乃至数十倍军事力量的军队存在，发动内战那只是家常便饭。

再说政治目的

缅军的第一个目的：企图继续坐拥“至高无上特权”籍以维护和巩固其既得利益；民盟政府在与缅军政治权力博弈中提出修改“08宪法”的政治主张，直接切中了缅政要害，希望民盟政府有朝一日能够撬开缅甸08宪法这把“双向加密铁锁”。缅军的第二个目的：始终念念不忘消灭民族武装组织。因此，缅军才以“穷兵黩武”著称。

缅甸的政治生态是畸形的，这种畸形的政治生态不仅使这个曾经比较富庶的国家，在几十年的内战中变得积贫积弱，而且，给众多少数民族带来了无尽的灾难。因此，不得不引起国际社会的广泛关注，美国、欧盟、加拿大等国先后因此对缅甸军方实施严厉制裁。迫于强大的国际压力，2004年，缅甸似乎也吹起了一丝民主化的微风。经历4年“漫长的努力”，至2008年，缅军控制下的缅甸政治终于炮制出一部活脱脱的“军人宪法”来。“08宪法”出台以后，2011年，尽管缅甸原军政府总理登盛脱下军装成为总统，但缅甸政治依然是“换汤不换药”。“缅甸从1962年至1990年缅甸是从一个军人政府到另一个军人政府”（注：这是中国山东大学硕士研究生谢静的学术观点），这个观点我不仅十分赞成，而且我认为从1962年至2011年的68年间，缅甸政治的本质都是军人政府。

那么2015年民盟政府上台至今又是一个什么状况呢？民盟政府倡导的国家和平进程中，缅军战事有增无减，缅军向民族武装组织发动了数百场战争，深受缅军百般阻扰的“21世纪彬龙会议”召开了三届，至今战火依然在缅军的手里频频点燃。其实大家都非常清楚，民盟政府虽然与缅军方展开了一系列的权力博弈，但仍然无法摆脱缅军的戗持，缅军依然是缅甸政治的主宰，依然坐拥“至高无上的特权”，缅甸政治依然没有脱离“军人政治”的本质。前些时有人在网上议论昂山素季的新政府不作为，除开民盟政府在政治策略上的因素，我认为更确切地说是“无能为力”。

缅甸军方在国家和平进程中大喊“建立政治互信”，却是通过频繁发动战争来证明自己“诚信”。靠战争“发家”的缅军集团，在长达60余年的内战中，以联邦国家利益和少数民族的灾难为代价，尝尽了“战争甜头”，自然更加迷信武力。

近几年来，中国在缅甸问题上一直在履行大国责任；作为缅甸的邻国，边境地区多次受缅北战事殃及，中方在缅投资也很大，主要还涉及“一带一路”、“人类命运共同体”、“大西洋通道”等国家战略…无论从哪一个方面来讲，中国都更需要一个和平的缅甸。但数年的付出、谦让、包容和努力似乎并没有在“劝和促谈”上取得实质性进展，究其根本原因，明眼人都知道，缅甸军方对中方也同对付民族革命组织一样，说的是一套，做得却是截然相反的一套，说穿了根本就不买中国的账！

8月27日，缅军头敏昂莱和米雅瓦迪的脸书账号被封杀。

据外媒体报道：联合国独立调查委员会针对罗兴亚人危及的调查报告出炉，该报告直接点名缅甸国防军总司令敏昂莱和另外5名高级将领，必须为若开帮发生的种族灭绝行为，以及若开帮、克钦邦、掸邦发生的危害人类罪和战争罪行受到调查和起诉。

缅军屡屡在中方的善意背后耍把戏，只有在强大的国际压力面前才向中方略加“示好”

近日，在中方的主持下，缅军方与缅北几个民族革命组织分别在云南大理和昆明举行了两次“劝和促谈”，据说不日将举行第三次。

据我个人观察，缅甸的和平关键在于缅甸军方。要么缅军方那一天愿意放弃建立独裁专制国家的天真梦想而回到以“彬龙协议”精神为基础的联邦国家的政体上来；要么缅军真诚接受中方的善意，真正停止内战，贯彻民族平等，实行符合国情的民族区域高度自治。只有这样，或许才能看到缅军的和平行动。否则，战争的氤氲难以驱散，和平的春天仍旧遥远。

  2018年9月10日

The clearest political aim of the "Binglong Conference of the 21st Century" in Myanmar is to achieve national reconciliation national peace. Judging from the circumstances of the first three meetings, the country's peace in Myanmar, which had been hoped for by the world, had not been successful on the whole had not once had the desired results. However, the "conference" also seems to have reached the greatest consensus on the need for genuine political mutual trust. Since it is mutual trust, then a certain direction to prove their integrity. Mutual trust is not a slogan, much less a false guise. If you say one thing do another, building mutual trust is simply a lie. As the saying goes, "listen to what you say, watch what you do", the most important thing is to watch your actions. "Building political mutual trust" is said most frequently by the Myanmar military, the most loudly mentioned is the Burmese military. Moreover, the Tatmadaw has always said that the nature content of the NCA agreement add up to a political trap. Myanmar's military has frequently accused the national revolutionary organizations that have not yet signed the NCA agreement of whether or not to sign the NCA agreement as a prerequisite for participating in the "Binglong meeting." Well, the question is, is it true that the civil war in Myanmar that all signed the NCA agreement will really stop? none of the seven (FPNCC) members of the Federal political negotiation Consultative Council have yet to sign it, the fundamental reason is that Whether or not to sign the NCA agreement will also be subject to military attack by the Tatmadaw. SSA (RCSS) has launched 80 wars against SSA-South (RCSS) in the three years since the signing of the NCA agreement, Myanmar online reported on Sept. 9. Myanmar's "21st Century Binglong Conference of the third meeting" ended on July 16, 2018 so far. In a short time of 54 days, the Myanmar military launched more than 10 military attacks on the Allied Forces. The preliminary statistics are as follows: 1. At 0500 hours on 19 July, the Tatmadaw launched an attack on a certain position of the 7th 8th battalions of the 211th Brigade of the Allied Army, the fighting lasted for nearly three hours; at 0800 hours on February 21 July, The Tatmadaw Army launched an attack on the Qingmushui position north of Guigui County of the 3rd Battalion of the Allied 211 Brigade, the fighting lasted two hours; from 15:10 to 24:00 on 13 August, The 210th 219 battalions of the 11th Tatmadaw Division launched 5 such attacks on the Dingguo Mountain garrison position north of Guigui County of the 511 Allied Brigade east of South Paga; at 0700 hours on 14 August, One by one, the 11th Tatmadaw Division launched attacks on the Dingguo Mountain garrison position north of Guigui County of the 511 Brigade of the Allied Army east of South Paga. At 0900 hours on May 17 August, the 99th Division of the Tatmadaw launched an attack on the 7th Battalion position of the Allied 211 Brigade. The fighting lasted nearly three hours; at 0900 hours on June 21 August, one of the 99th divisions of the Tatmadaw launched an attack on a certain position of the 8th Battalion of the Allied 211 Brigade; 13:00 on July 29 August, one of the 99th divisions of the Tatmadaw launched an attack on the 8th Battalion of the 211th Brigade of the Allied Forces. 8. 12:00 on 30 August, one of the 99th divisions of the Tatmadaw launched another offensive against the 8th Battalion of the 211th Brigade of the Allied Army; on September 30 August, the Moutai Army fired five rounds of artillery fire at the southern end of the Red Rock liberated area of the 17th Allied Battalion. 05:50 on 31 August, the Tatmadaw again launched an offensive against the armed units of the Allied 511 Brigade until 10:30; 19:00 on November 31 August, Artillery troops from the Lastheir Garrison fired artillery shells at the 8th Battalion of the Allied 211 Brigade at Laiwo Mountain, north of Papan; 09:46 on December 2 September, the 99th Division of the Tatmadaw launched an attack on the rear hill position on the side of the Salwin River; the fighting lasted about 40 minutes. In addition, the Tatmadaw launched several military provocations against the Allied forces. As a result of the active withdrawal of the Allied forces, there was no exchange of fire. During this period, the Tatmadaw also launched a war against the Kachin Independence Army, the de Aung National Liberation Army, Rakhine other national revolutionary armed forces. This is what the Burmese Army calls "political mutual trust". The Myanmar military does not act in words deeds, it acts in a strange way. Although it has a profound political background, it cannot in any way conceal its clear political purpose. First of all, the political background 1. In 1962, the Tatmadaw took over the political stage of Myanmar when it launched a military coup. For more than half a century, the government of the Union of Myanmar has been replaced by the "junta". 2. The Myanmar military Government has concocted the 2008 Constitution, which is essentially a military Constitution, which contains several key elements. Excerpts read as follows: article 6, paragraph 6: "always insists on the ability of the armed forces to participate in assume leadership over the political life of the country"; article 20, paragraph 2: "the Myanmar Defence Force has the right to independently conduct all matters relating to the armed forces"; Paragraph 3: "the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the State"; paragraph 6: "the primary duty of the army is to defend the Constitution." In the details of the 2008 Constitution, two core elements were laid down, locking up the supreme prerogatives of the Myanmar military. One is that the military occupies 25% of the total number of seats in parliament, the other is the resolution on the legislative, judicial executive powers of the State of the Union of Myanmar, which must be approved by more than 75% of the seats before it can enter into force. Regardless of other privileges, no detailed analysis of the above provisions is required to arrive at the clearest determination that the Myanmar Defence Force is accorded the supreme prerogative of the Myanmar Defence Force over the Government of the Union of Myanmar under the Constitution of 08. 3. There are four main aspects of the economic support for the protracted civil war waged by the Myanmar Defence Force. First, the state's "normal military budget"; second, military production (covering military industry, commodity production, domestic international trade; exploitation utilization of major resources such as Myanmar jadeite, jade, natural gas, water conservancy, etc.). Fourth, a large proportion of the international sources of funds are used for military expenditure. The United States'"foreign policy" has written that Myanmar's military junta's desperate interest groups, which Myanmar's countrymen have become "close friends" with the military, have become obstacles to the country's economic reform before "coming to an end." Essentially, it is still "directly controlled" by the military. It is nothing but a thin coat of invisibility, as exemplified by (Max Myanmar Group), the big Burmese group. 4. The soil of great Burman nationalism. As you know, the population of the Union of Myanmar is about 52 million consists of 135 ethnic groups, of which about 35 million are Burmese, accounting for 68 percent of the total population of the country. Burma is the main ethnic group. During the period of British colonization of India Myanmar, after deeply understanding studying the ethnic Burmese, the Indian Governor Dahe Xu had come to the conclusion that among the many peoples in the East, I had never seen a nation as arrogant as the Burman. In one word, this sentence speaks the national character of the Burman people. A similar survey has been conducted. Since the independence of Myanmar in 1947, the vast majority of Burmese have had such a ridiculous idea that the Union of Myanmar is a Union of Burmese, not a Union of 135 ethnic groups. Myanmar is the home of the Burmese, not the 135. It can be said that the hearts of the Burmese people are shrouded in a very extreme Burman mood. Based on this, the Myanmar Defence Force has "of course" contributed to the use of these forces. On the one hand, it has continuously used military force to infringe on the legitimate rights interests of other ethnic minorities, on the other hand, it has become a "hero" in safeguarding the interests of the ethnic Burmese. As a result, the "Myanmar Defence Force", which has supreme privileges, is deeply rooted in the "fertile soil" of "Greater Burmanism," which not only appears to have "deep roots," but also seems to be "more lush." It is not difficult to see from the above four points, The Myanmar Defence Force (MDF) is an army with supreme privilege, supremacy over the federal government, almost complete possession of the resources of the whole country, an absolute dominant nation the soil of greater Burmese ethnotism, has been operating for more than half a century. In the presence of such an army, which is far more powerful than any national revolutionary armed force, 10 or even tens of times the military force, it is only routine to start a civil war. Moreover, the first objective of the Tatmadaw is to try to maintain consolidate its vested interests by continuing to enjoy "supreme privilege"; the NLD government has put forward a political proposal to amend the 2008 Constitution in a game of political power with the Tatmadaw. Directly hit the heart of the Burmese government, hoping that the NLD government will one day be able to pry open the 08 constitution of Myanmar this "two-way encryption iron lock." The second purpose of the Tatmadaw is to keep in mind the elimination of national armed groups. Therefore, the Tatmadaw is known as "militaristic". Myanmar's political ecology is deformed, which not only made this once relatively rich country become poor weak in decades of civil war, but also brought endless disaster to many ethnic minorities. As a result, the United States, the European Union, Canada other countries have successively imposed severe sanctions on the Myanmar military. Under strong international pressure, Myanmar also seemed to have blown a breeze of democratization in 2004. After four years of "long efforts", by 2008, Myanmar's politics under the control of the Burmese Army finally produced a living "military Constitution." After the introduction of the 08 Constitution, in 2011, Myanmar's former junta Prime Minister Thein Sein took off his military uniform to become president, but Myanmar's politics is still a "change of soup medicine." "Myanmar from 1962 to 1990 Myanmar is from one military government to another military government" (Note: this is China Shandong University graduate student Xie Jing's academic view), I not only very much agree with this view, I think for 68 years from 1962 to 2011, the essence of Burmese politics was the military government. Well, what is the situation of the NLD government since it came to power in 2015? in the national peace process advocated by the NLD government, the fighting of the Burmese army has increased unabated, the Tatmadaw has launched hundreds of wars against ethnic armed groups. The "Binglong Conference of the 21st Century", which was obstructed by the Tatmadaw, has been held for three sessions, the war is still ignited frequently in the hands of the Tatmadaw. In fact, we all know very well that although the NLD government has engaged in a series of power games with the Myanmar military, it is still unable to get rid of the bravado of the Tatmadaw. The Burmese Army is still the of Myanmar politics still enjoys "supreme privileges." Myanmar politics is still not divorced from the essence of "military politics". In addition to the political strategy of the NLD government, I think it is more precisely "powerless" to talk about the inaction of Aung San Suu Kyi's new government on the Internet some time ago. Myanmar's military has shouted "building political trust" in the country's peace process, but has proved its "integrity" by frequently waging wars. During the 60 years of civil war, the Tatmadaw group, which relied on the war to "become rich in its family," tasted the "war sweetness" at the expense of the national interests of the Federation the disaster of the minority nationalities, naturally became more superstitious in the use of force. In recent years, China has been fulfilling its responsibilities as a major power on the issue of Myanmar. As a neighboring country of Myanmar, the border areas have been affected many times by the war in the north of Myanmar, China has also invested heavily in Myanmar. Mainly also involves "Belt Road", "human destiny community", "Atlantic passage" other national strategies. In either way, China needs a peaceful Myanmar. However, the years of effort, humility, tolerance effort did not seem to have made substantial progress in "persuading peace promoting talks." the underlying cause is that the Myanmar military has said the same thing to the Chinese side as it does to the National Revolutionary Organization. The opposite is true, to put it bluntly, not buying Chinese accounts at all! on Aug. 27, the Tatmadaw's Facebook accounts Miyawadi's Facebook accounts were blocked. According to foreign media reports: the UN Independent investigation Commission's report on the Rohingya threat was released, which directly named Burma Defence Force Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Rae five other senior generals, who must be responsible for the genocide committed by the Rakhine Gang. Crimes against humanity war crimes committed in Rakhine, Kachin Shan States were investigated prosecuted. The Tatmadaw has repeatedly played tricks behind the goodwill of the Chinese side. It is only in the face of strong international pressure that it "shows a little kindness" to the Chinese side recently, under the auspices of the Chinese side. The Tatmadaw side several national revolutionary organizations in the north of Myanmar held two "peace talks" in Dali Kunming, Yunnan, it is said that the third meeting will be held shortly. According to my own observation, the key to peace in Myanmar lies with the Myanmar military. Either the Burmese military would give up the naive dream of establishing a dictatorship return to the regime of a federal state based on the spirit of the "Binglong Agreement", or the Burmese army would sincerely accept the goodwill of the Chinese side truly stop the civil war. We will implement ethnic equality implement a high degree of autonomy for ethnic regions in line with our national conditions. Only in this way may the Tatmadaw's peace operations be seen. Otherwise, the clouds of war are hard to disperse, the spring of peace is still far away. 

September 10, 2018